

8 June 1967

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** Director of Central Intelligence

**SUBJECT :** New Book: To Move A Nation by Roger Hilsman

1. This memorandum is for information only to invite your attention to a new book entitled To Move A Nation by Roger Hilsman (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1967). Mr. Hilsman is now a professor in the Columbia University School of International Affairs. His career as Director of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research and as Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs is, of course, well known to you.

2. Reading through this 580 page book is something like trying to plow through a field of rocks, and this reviewer has not read all of it as he wished to bring it to your attention as quickly as possible. The book is not helped by rather small print and slightly off-white paper that makes it a typographical monstrosity. As the author himself notes, it is partly a theoretical study in political science, part history, and part memoir. In a television interview, the author refused to answer directly a question as to whether the Department of State had cleared the book for publication but he does say in his preface and in his interview that it was reviewed by "qualified specialists" to ensure against security breaches. He adds that all his documentation, notes of meetings, memoranda for the record and telephone conversations, which have been his sources in the book, have been left in his personal papers at the Kennedy Library. One wonders whether this deposit includes some intelligence material to which even future scholars should not have access.

3. Mr. Hilsman seems obsessed with what he calls "the rivalries of the great Executive departments, State, Defense, and the Central Intelligence Agency, as they clash in the actual making of policy ..." (p. 13). Again, in talking of the problems of the State Department, Hilsman states:

"But whichever alternative the President finally chose, it had to take into account the personalities

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involved--Dean Rusk, Robert S. McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, John A. McCone, the man chosen to replace Allen Dulles as Director of CIA, and, finally, the President himself." (pgs. 38-39).

Again, on page 40, he talks of "The personality equation ... had five main variables," listing above named officials. Again, he notes the President's need to "maximize strengths and compensate for weaknesses" in these officials, adding:

"McCone's qualities as a fighter would make him invaluable in keeping the intelligence community in line, but the President had also to be sure that McCone did not stray beyond those responsibilities, as well as to find means to ensure that intelligence estimates and reports continued to be balanced and objective if there was indeed the risk some people feared in McCone's militant anti-Communism." (p. 49)

4. At pages 46-47, Hilsman gives his personal evaluation of Mr. McCone, noting that at the time of his appointment "many of us were afraid the administration was buying trouble." To calm his own fears, Hilsman called Senator Henry Jackson who spoke very highly of Mr. McCone; Hilsman condescendingly admits that

"... "I did indeed come to like him as a man. He was very ambitious, but disarmingly candid about it.

"... his intelligence judgments and policy predictions were toward a selective, discriminating application of toughness, tailored to the particular situation. ... I'm sure there was a streak of the alley fighter in McCone, but there was also a rough and ready sense of decency."

5. It is apparent that Secretary Rusk is not Mr. Hilsman's favorite character and, in trying to explain the Secretary, he repeats many anti-Rusk remarks and statements. In the end, Hilsman feels that President Kennedy had no other choice but to be his own Secretary of State and Hilsman notes that

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"... it was increasingly clear that the State Department and the Secretary did not have a very firm grip on the ball, nor were they going to run with it." (p. 25).

In fact, Hilsman's "hero" appears more likely to be Chester Bowles, of whom he says that

"He had in those few months done more than any other man in the administration to correct the imbalance that had existed in the previous administration between the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency." (p. 36)

6. In discussing the State Department's establishment of its Operations Center (which he considered a "gimmick"), Hilsman notes that "Even the CIA had modern communications and coding equipment" but that the State Department's cryptographic equipment was obsolescent. He also notes his reorganization of INR which included developing the philosophy of policy-oriented research and intelligence papers.

7. Hilsman devotes a few pages to the Bay of Pigs (pgs. 30-34). One of the factors which he assigns as the cause of the failure of the Bay of Pigs was that Mr. Dulles and Mr. Bissell had become "emotionally involved." Hilsman states that he knew nothing of the plans "until one day in a meeting Allen Dulles let drop a remark that made me realize something was up." Hilsman went right to Secretary Rusk and said that such plans must be based on a CIA expectation that the Cuban people would rise and requested the Secretary's permission to put INR personnel to work on the problem. The Secretary refused permission because the operation was being so tightly held. Hilsman assigns a part of the debacle at the Bay of Pigs to the failure of the Secretary in "not insisting that experts who had a contribution to make should be allowed to make it", and adds that

"My personal lesson from the Bay of Pigs is that in such circumstances an official should not ask to be permitted to do a study, but should simply go ahead with whatever study seems necessary on his own authority. ... there was no risk from [INR personnel] of a break in security."

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He notes that Mr. Amory was also kept in the dark and that this meant "that the President was denied the judgment of CIA's own estimators on the research side of the organization." It is also Hilsman's opinion that the cancelation of the so-called "second strike" did not doom the Bay of Pigs operation, because it was doomed from the beginning.

8. Hilsman devotes a major portion of his book to studies of particular crises areas. These include Laos, the Cuban missile crisis, the Congo, Communist China, the Indonesian area and Vietnam. In discussing the Vietnamese situation, he denies some of the reckless charges made against John Richardson and the latter advises me that Hilsman's comments in this connection and in connection with Richardson's recall are substantially accurate except for Hilsman's comments that certain allegations of the CIA "split" in Vietnam were leaked to the press by CIA personnel in disagreement with Agency or U. S. policy. Hilsman states of CIA in Vietnam that

"The notion that they took policy into their own hands against the policy of Washington made its way into almost every paper in the United States. But in fact, Richardson and the agency were meticulous in clearing even routine matters they thought might have political repercussions."

The section on the Congo concerns events prior to CIA's involvement in Congo affairs. I have asked for Mr. Colby's comments on the section of the book which deals with Far Eastern affairs.

9. Part III of To Move A Nation consists of three chapters on "President Kennedy and the CIA" and is 25 pages long. A separate analysis of this section is attached as Tab "A".

Walter Pforzheimer  
Curator  
Historical Intelligence Collection

Attachment

Tab "A"

Distribution:

Orig & 1 - Addressee w/book	1 - DCI/Nipe (Mr. Bross) w/ bk	STAT
1 - DDCI w/book	1 - OGC 1 - DDP [ ] w/bk	STAT
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Tab "A"

**SUBJECT: Analysis of Part III, "President Kennedy and the CIA" in  
To Move A Nation by Roger Hilsman**

1. Part III comprises chapters 6, 7 and 8: "The Problems of CIA;" "The Kennedy Compromise;" and "Secret Intelligence in a Free Society." Mr. Hilsman commences chapter 6 by quoting President Kennedy as stating, after the Bay of Pigs, that "we will have to deal with the CIA." He then quotes at length from President Truman's well-published article about the CIA which was published on 22 December 1963. [Mr. Hilsman presumably has not been apprised of President Truman's subsequent private statement that he did not write the article personally, and that it did not represent his views.] Hilsman then sets forth the usual list of shopworn charges against the Agency made in various public media and also quotes in passing from The Invisible Government by "two responsible journalists." He notes that

"Some of these charges were undoubtedly motivated by nothing more than sensationalism. But some of the concern was very real. ... The root fear was that the CIA represented a Staat-im-Staat, a state within a state, and certainly the basis for fear was there." (p. 64)

Hilsman tries to balance these comments by declaring that

"From my own personal experience, I know that ... most of the more extreme charges about CIA were not valid. ... it has succeeded in bringing an objectivity ... that was previously unknown in the American government's analyses of events abroad. The United States, in fact, owes the men and women of CIA an extraordinary debt." (p. 65).

But Hilsman immediately follows these statements by saying that "the CIA still represented a most serious problem, as President Truman said." To Hilsman, this problem is summed up in one word -- power.

2. The author describes what he considers to be the various elements of CIA power. The first element is that CIA had people, usually more numerous and more able than their opposite interdepartmental numbers. "What is more," he states, "the people in CIA were outstandingly able,

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which was itself a source of power." (In some cases abroad, he notes subsequently, the Chief of Station may be more able than the Ambassador.) Hilsman's second ingredient is that CIA had money together with freedom from normal accounting procedures, which gave it flexibility. Hilsman notes that while certain of our activities would be acceptable if State Department funds were utilized, they become "sinister" when CIA money is used. (One of the items he includes in his "sinister" category is buying books abroad!) Other ingredients in his power picture include CIA's command of information and its need for secrecy. A further element of CIA's alleged power is that its function is "politically appealing" and brings about a natural alliance with the congressional power center. As a final element of CIA power, Hilsman lists the fact that the Secretary of State and Allen Dulles were brothers. He feels that this relationship has become the focus of the high resentment of CIA in the Foreign Service and the Department; although he adds that Allen Dulles "probably never presumed" on the relationship. Hilsman also points out that State people often did not realize that there was a basis for resentment against them in CIA as well. He avers that all of these matters were of concern to the Kennedy administration but that the paramount issue was the power and role of the Agency.

3. In Chapter 7, Hilsman notes that shortly after he became Director of INR in February 1961, Secretary Rusk called him together with David Bell, then Director of the Bureau of the Budget, to talk about the problems of the intelligence community, "apparently at the instigation of the White House." The Secretary assigned two tasks: One was for Hilsman to get INR in shape; the second was for Hilsman and the Bureau of the Budget to look at the role of intelligence abroad and the interdepartmental procedures for coordinating foreign policy and intelligence activities to see if they could be improved.

4. In describing his reorganization of INR, Hilsman notes that the transfer of the National Intelligence Surveys, biographic and other "pedestrian" functions to CIA removed dependence on CIA for about 40% of the INR budget. He adds that transferring these functions created some opposition in the House Foreign Affairs Committee, which, Hilsman claims, shared many of the Department's resentments of the Agency for many of the same reasons as well as for the additional reason of the Agency's "special relationship" with its "secret subcommittee." (p.71) By reducing his functions, Hilsman was able to concentrate INR's research in three categories: "the traditional intelligence estimating, including State Department participation in the

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National Intelligence Estimates;" evaluating current developments; and "policy-oriented" research. Modestly, Hilsman adds that "the results were visible almost overnight--we began to get, as I said, just the right kind of crisp, taut, to-the-point analyses that were needed." (p. 72)

5. Hilsman then turns to the problem of coordination of intelligence operations and places a part of the blame for certain failures on the organization within the Department itself. He therefore recommended that all coordination for intelligence and covert action should be consolidated in INR but remarks that this idea was immediately blocked by Allen Dulles himself; Secretary Rusk was reluctant to take the matter to the White House although Under Secretary Bowles urged this course. Another problem which Hilsman considered in INR was the role of CIA in the conduct of foreign policy. He felt that there were "too many CIA people abroad, in a word, doing too much and doing it too successfully." (p. 77) Thus, at the time the Kennedy administration took office, CIA, in Hilsman's opinion, was being credited for almost everything that happened abroad -- good or bad -- because it combined too many of the resources and instruments of foreign policy. Hilsman felt that the ideal solution was along British lines which kept research and analysis functions separate from secret intelligence collection and subordinated the latter "very sharply" to the Foreign Office. He notes that this proposal would have involved legislation which would have been impossible "in the face of CIA's natural strength with the coalition of Southern Democrats and conservative Republicans that dominated Congress." (p. 77) As a result, there was a general stalemate in these plans until the Bay of Pigs.

6. Following the Bay of Pigs, Hilsman reports that Arthur Schlesinger spent considerable time on the problem of the Agency and finally proposed taking CIA research and estimating and all other overt activities out of CIA; taking INR out of State; and combining them into a new agency. This would have left a renamed CIA with covert functions and would have placed it directly under the State Department for "policy guidance." State Department studies pointed in the same direction. [These proposals ironically contained many of the same ingredients as those proposed in 1946 by Secretary of State Byrnes which were rejected by President Truman.] As these studies progressed, Hilsman suddenly became aware of two more "threats." One was Mr. McCone himself, whom Hilsman quotes as intending to become "a power in this administration"; the second was the establishment of the Defense Intelligence Agency. He adds that

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"The State Department did not want the Director of CIA to be so strong as to dominate foreign policy, but it certainly wanted him to be strong enough to prevent the Defense Intelligence Agency from dominating foreign policy." (p. 81)

Hilsman admits that

"... McCone was restrained in his use of the power of CIA. ... And McCone was equally restrained in exercising his power within the intelligence community. ... But the long-run problem of the CIA remained." (p. 82)

7. In Chapter 8, Hilsman turns to his concepts of secret intelligence in a free society and states that

"The CIA is not a threat to our liberties and never has been. It is composed of dedicated officers of extremely high standards of integrity and patriotism." (p. 83)

He notes the problem of CIA secrecy and reports the old canard that Ambassador Adlai Stevenson was ignorant of the planned invasion of Cuba, and several similar well-worn charges.

8. While Hilsman feels that the U. S. must oppose Communist tactics of subversion in third countries and use the methods of secret intelligence for this purpose, it is his opinion that covert political action became a fad and was used when other alternatives existed. It is his opinion that covert action "was really nothing more than a gimmick. In very special circumstances, it was a useful supplement, but nothing more." (p. 86) Despite these thoughts, Hilsman feels that there are "some advantages to having the kind of centralized intelligence setup which CIA represents." (p. 87)

9. Hilsman recommends that certain changes in CIA functions and powers be slowly and deliberately made. One is to begin the reduction in the number of covert action operations. [This book was presumably written before the Ramparts exposés; in any event, no reference to them is made.] A second is to "concentrate clandestine intelligence collection operations on matters of true threat to the nation and put the savings into improving the quality." The third step is to reduce the numbers and visibility of CIA overseas personnel and "permit a freer transfer of able CIA people into the



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foreign service sooner." And finally encourage the State Department to assert policy control and guidance more vigorously. When these steps are accomplished, Hilsman feels that the proposals outlined by Schlesinger (noted in paragraph 6) should be considered.

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